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A large body of literature on the relationship between prejudice and discrimination and the size 
of minority populations suggests that as a minority population increases so will incidents of 
prejudice and/or discrimination. This school of thought is led by Hubert Blalock who contends 
that large minority populations generate prejudice among the majority, who view the minority as 
a threat to their economic and/or political standing. Minority population size has been tested and 
widely confirmed as a cause of anti-black prejudice and discrimination. But the corresponding 
research for Latinos has generally produced inconsistent and largely inconclusive findings. The 
reason for this confusion, according to this thesis, is that prior research has not accounted for a 
major turning point in the migration of Latinos. It is my contention that there are, in fact, two 
distinct Latino communities. One resides in the old and well-established immigrant communities 
that have been the destination of Latino migrants throughout the 20
th
 century. But in recent years, 
Latino migrants settled in new destinations, in far-flung places, some very remote and generally 
lacking the social control benefits of old and well-established Latino enclaves. Thus, the link 
between anti-Latino sentiment and population size is more complex than previously considered. 
As such, my research produces four interrelated findings: 1) There is a positive relationship 
between percent change in the population of Latinos and resentment toward them among non-
Latinos. 2) This effect exists in new Latino destinations, but not in old destinations. 3) The 
arrival of Latinos generates a broader resentment, not just toward Latinos specifically, but 
toward other minorities as well. These findings confirm the first three hypotheses. But the fourth 
finding does not support the final hypothesis. Specifically, my results do not confirm that anti-
minority sentiment (in this case, toward Latinos) are rooted in competition over jobs. There is no 
significant link between the relative size of the low-skill labor market and anti-Latino prejudice. 





Intergroup relations and racial/ethnic tension has been of interest to sociologists for some 
time. Extant studies generally find that the proportionate size of the minority population is 
positively related to prejudice (Pettigrew 1959; Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1986; Blalock 1967) 
and to income inequality (Blalock 1956 & 1957), school segregation (Pettigrew 1957; Harris 
1968;Robey 1970), employment inequalities (Frisbie & Neidert 1977; Fosset & Kiecolt 1989; 
Cassirer 1996; Cohen 1998), discrimination in housing (Farley et al. 1978; Clark 1991; Bobo, 
Schuman & Steeh 1986), political inequality (Giles & Buckner 1993; Corzine, Creech, & 
Corzine 1983;Black & Black 1987;), and even violent acts towards minority members. (Reed 
1972; Levine & Campbell 1972).  
According to Blalock, the link between the minority population and prejudice and 
discrimination has its basis in the perceived threats that minorities pose to the economic interests 
and political power of the dominant group. This threat intensifies as the size of the minority 
group increases. The bulk of the research evidence comes from studies linking black population 
size to anti-black sentiment among the rest of the population. These studies generally support the 
view that a large minority population is perceived as a threat to the interests of the majority, who 
then feel prejudice and engage in discrimination in order to protect their interests. In short, the 
larger the minority, the greater the prejudice directed against them.  
 Majority sentiment may be especially relevant today given that Latinos are now the 
nation‘s largest minority, accounting for approximately 12.5% of the U.S. population (U.S. 
Census 2000 Brief), up by 57.9% from 1990 (Census Bureau 2000). However, the evidence that 
a large Latino population generates anti-Latino sentiment is mixed. Some scholars claim no link 
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(Lieberson 1980; Massey & Denton 1993; Taylor 1998; Dixon & Rosenbaum 2004) while others 
claim there is evidence of an association similar to that found in the black-non-black research 
(Espenshade & Hempstead 1996; Quillian 1995).   
 This mix of contradictory findings regarding the causes of anti-Latino prejudice may be 
because the extant research overlooks an important change in the migration history of Latinos. 
Traditionally, Latinos settled mainly in two border states, Texas and California, and in one 
Midwestern state, Illinois (Massey and Capoferro 2009). Gradually, these traditional destinations 
flourished into rich immigrant communities in which Spanish was widely spoken. New arrivals 
were greeted with a culturally familiar setting, surrounded either by fellow-Latinos, or by non-
Latinos who, to varying degrees, were reconciled to the area‘s ethnic diversity. But starting in the 
mid-1990s, Latino migrants headed en masse to new destinations, including the Old South, the 
Midwest, and the upper states on both the East and West coast (Durand, Massey, and Capoferro 
2005). Indeed, hundreds of counties would have experienced a population decline were it not for 
the influx of Latino migrants (Lichter and Johnson 2006). This abrupt change perhaps jolted the 
local residents who heretofore had little or no contact with Latinos.  It may have been viewed by 
locals as a threat to the local way of life and signaled a new wave of competition for low skill 
jobs (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a).  In other words, new Latino migrants are settling in very 
different places from those of their predecessors. Thus, there may be systematic regional 
differences in anti-Latino sentiment. More importantly, these regional differences may suggest 
that anti-Latino sentiment is linked not just to the presence of Latinos, nor to the mere fact of 
Latino migration – as prior research suggests – but to the types of communities in which 
migrants are settling.  
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 Using Census data as well as restricted files from the General Social Survey (GSS) for 
1990 and 2000, this thesis examines whether population growth among Latinos is linked to the 
negative feelings towards them. The backdrop for the analysis is the national-level shift in Latino 
immigration and how this shift explains the potential regional differences in anti-Latino 


















REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 Previous hypotheses by group conflict theorists propose that prejudice and 
discrimination, in the form of anti-black sentiment and violent actions, against minorities will 
occur more often when there are large numbers of minorities (Levine & Campbell 1972; Bobo 
1988). The causal mechanism for this link, according to Blalock‘s (1967) ―power-threat‖ 
hypothesis, (see also Tolnay, Beck & Massey 1989) asserts that as a minority population 
increases, the majority will perceive this as a threat to their socioeconomic and political interests. 
As a result, the majority will begin to view the minority negatively, which may find expression 
in discriminatory behavior. According to the power-threat hypothesis, prejudice among majority 
members is especially intense when economic resources are scarce and there is competition 
between majority and minority groups – leading to claims that ―minorities are taking our jobs‖. 
For instance, negative attitudes among whites towards blacks would rise when more blacks enter 
the labor force, leading whites to perceive this as a threat to their economic interests. The same 
notion applies to political interests as well: As blacks make inroads in political and/or legal 
arenas, whites, according to this perspective, may fear a loss in their own political influence.  
Blalock‘s power-threat hypothesis has also been described as the visibility-discrimination 
hypothesis in which an increase in a minority population provokes an increase in the hostile 
collective reaction among the majority. But regardless of the label, the idea is the same; 
prejudice and/or discrimination by the majority will occur if they perceive a threat to their social, 






 Tests of Blalock‘s theory confirm that black-white relations in the United States are in 
part driven by a power-threat dynamic. In real-world terms, larger black populations (percent 
black) are linked to white prejudice, and to negative practices such as school segregation, 
housing discrimination, employment and wage discrimination, political support for anti-black 
politicians, and even violence against blacks. For instance, anti-black prejudice among Southern 
whites is positively related to the size of the black population (Pettigrew 1959; Giles 1977). In 
particular, white racial policy towards blacks becomes more negative as the proportion of blacks 
within a county increases (Giles and Evans 1986), but the tipping point of white prejudice seems 
to occur when blacks reach at least 40% of the county‘s population, at which point the perceived 
threat prompts whites to socially distance themselves from blacks through discriminatory actions 
such as intimidation, harassment, or other extreme measures intended to rid their neighborhoods 
of blacks (Green, Strolovich, & Wong 1998).  Blalock (1967) also predicts that the increased 
perception of threat of blacks towards whites will lead to discrimination of blacks through the 
denial of social concerns. Fosset & Kiecolt (1989) find that as the proportion of blacks in an area 
increased, whites felt increasingly threatened, which in turn reduced their support for racial 
integration. The authors also argued that percent black is likely to increase inequalities in both 
educational attainment and the quality of education. Fossett and Kiecolt also emphasized that 
whites‘ negative response to black numbers exists in both Southern and non-Southern regions of 
the United States. Extending this work, Quillian (1995) combines survey and macro-population 
data in a multi-level analysis to demonstrate the importance of how perceived group threat can 
result in the formation of prejudicial attitudes among majority members towards a minority.  
Specifically, Quillian also finds that a rise in black-white contact is associated with anti-black 
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attitudes across time and region and that ―the relative size of the subordinate group and the 
economic situation of the particular country can strongly influence the degree of prejudice 
expressed by dominant group members‖ (Quillian 1995:606).  Likewise, Taylor (1998) also finds 
that whites increasingly perceive blacks as an economic threat as the relative size of their 
population increases. In short, the evidence confirms that whites see large black populations as a 
threat to their relative power, and that perception can further lead to discriminatory actions. 
 Income Inequality 
 An early indicator of discriminatory behavior against blacks is income inequality. Using 
1950‘s Census with a sample of 88 S.M.S.A.‘s Blalock (1956) found a positive relationship 
between percent black and white/black income differentials, though the strength of this finding 
was rendered statistically insignificant due to simultaneous controls for region, white income, 
and percent employed in the manufacturing industry. However, in a follow-up study for Southern 
counties, Blalock (1957) found a significant link between percent non-white and income 
inequality. The study also links the size of the non-white population to racial inequalities in 
housing, income, and educational attainment. 
School Segregation 
School segregation has long been used as an indicator of discrimination. Pettigrew (1957) 
finds that enduring school segregation was most common in states where there was a large black 
population. Furthermore, Pettigrew and Cramer (1959) found that school segregation in 
Kentucky and Missouri was not random. On the contrary, efforts to reverse school segregation 
first occurred in border states, the mid-South, and cities—areas with low black-white ratios. 
They suggest that lower black-white ratios would result in less prejudicial stimuli towards blacks 
because there is less intergroup competition for economic resources. Harris (1968) re-examined 
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Pettigrew and Cramer‘s data and, consistent with previous research, finds that high black-white 
population ratios are linked to high levels of school segregation in the South. Indeed, Harris 
maintains that in the South, the black-white population ratio is the most important predictor of 
school segregation. Likewise, Robey (1970), in his study of 872 southern county school districts, 
determined that ―the single strongest explanatory variable [of school segregation] is the percent 
of the population Negro in 1960‖ (Robey: 81). 
Employment Inequality 
Frisbie and Neidert (1977) observe that occupational inequality is greater where a high 
percentage of minorities is found. Their results were consistent regardless whether the minority 
was Mexican American or black. Similarly, Tienda and Lii (1987) find that in labor-markets 
flooded with high numbers of blacks, all groups of minority men had reduced earnings. In their 
test of the ‗visibility-discrimination hypothesis‘ Burre, Galle, and Fosett (1991) find that despite 
an overall decrease in the average level of inequality in Southern metropolitan areas, regions 
with larger percentages of blacks had higher black-white occupational inequality. This conforms 
to Fosset and Kiecolt‘s (1989) finding that whites restrict the access of blacks to higher status 
occupations by controlling/restricting social, economic, and political privileges.  More recently, 
Cassirer (1996) and Cohen (1998) observe that a large percentage of a minority population leads 
the majority to discriminate, as evidenced in employment and wage inequalities. Cassirer (1996) 
reveals an inverse relationship between the proportion black and the earnings of black males in 
non-Southern metropolitan areas. This relationship can be occupationally specific; Cohen (1998) 






In further support, Farley et al. (1978), Clark (1991), Bobo, Schuman, and Steeh (1986) 
all have found evidence that whites prefer being the dominant racial class within a neighborhood. 
Specifically, their studies argue that whites express a desire to be part of a racially integrated 
neighborhood only if they remain the predominant racial group. Massey and Denton (1993) 
contend that one mechanism by which whites maintain control over their economic interests and 
their political power is to prevent blacks from entering their neighborhoods – the root cause of 
residential segregation (see also Massey, Gross, and Shibuya 1994, Yinger 1997). Emerson 
(1994) finds that residential segregation in Southern cities is highest when the black population is 
large. Indeed, Parker, Stults, and Rice (2005) assert that the spatial isolation of blacks to poor 
areas is one mechanism by which whites manage and contain this perceived threat. 
Political Inequality 
 Discrimination against blacks is also manifested through voting anti-black or anti-black 
policy candidates into office. Giles and Buckner (1993) demonstrate that the independent 
variable percent black is positively linked to levels of white support for ex-Klu Klux Klansman 
David Duke. The authors assert that the effect of percent black on support for David Duke might 
only occur in the South. Similarly, Corzine, Creech, and Corzine (1983) maintain that white 
hostility towards blacks stems from a perceived political threat. When whites sense that blacks 
might seize political power, they express their fear at the voting booth. Specifically, a perceived 
political threat from blacks will prompt whites to vote for politicians who pledge to resist pro-
black policies. The authors in fact find that percent black is associated with such discriminatory 
behaviors, and the effect exists only in the South. Indeed, black political influence in the 
Democratic Party may have cost the party white support in the South (Black and Black 1987; 
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Carmines and Stimson 1989; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Lamis 1988; Parent 1988; Sundquist 
1983).  For instance, in the 1984 presidential election Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989) observe that 
white support for Democratic Party candidates decreased as the percentage of blacks in the 
state‘s Democratic Party coalition increased (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld). Specifically, data from 
Louisiana parishes (1975-1990) show that increases in the proportions of blacks is linked to a 
rise in Republican registration and a decrease in Democratic registration among whites (Giles 
and Hertz 1994). Overall, Carsey (2001) asserts that ―individual preferences on various issues 
and their voting behavior have been shown to be affected by the racial make-up of the contextual 
environment within which people find themselves‖ (Carsey: 1). 
Violence 
 Violence is the most extreme expression of hatred toward minorities. Reed (1972) finds a 
positive relationship between percent black and the number of lynchings that occurred in 
Southern states between 1889 and 1930. Likewise, research conducted by Levine and Campbell 
(1972) and Bobo (1988) also finds that attacks on minorities occur more frequently when 
minority populations are large. Tolnay and Beck (1995) link anti-black lynching in the prewar 
South to the demographic changes in the black population. Specifically, as the population of 
blacks increased in the prewar South, there was a concomitant rise in anti-black lynching. Giles 
(1977) reports a positive relationship between the proportion black and white Southerner‘s levels 
of violence at the county level.  
 Green, Strolovich, and Wong‘s research on social distance between minority and 
majority members closely parallels Blalock‘s hypothesis. The majority of research on social 
distance (Bobo 1988; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo; Farley et al.; Clark 1991) indicates that whites 
indeed prefer to keep ―social distance‘ between themselves and minority members. Green, 
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Strolovich, and Wong (1998) attempt to further this finding by testing the idea that ―If racially 
motivated crime reflects whites‘ stated attitudes regarding social distance, we should expect 
attacks to be more numerous in areas where minority populations have grown to the point at 
which white predominance is threatened‖ (Green, Strolovich, & Wong 1998: 374). True to their 
assumptions, Green, Strolovich and Wong (1998) find that hate crimes are more common when 
previously white areas are infiltrated by minority populations.  Conversely, the authors find that 
areas that have already been integrated experience a lower number of hate crimes.  
The Rise of Latinos in the United States 
 Although this research focuses mainly on blacks, there was always a presumption of 
generalizability in Blalock‘s ideas, that prejudice and discrimination would be directed toward 
any group that threatened majority hegemony. So now that Latinos are the largest minority in the 
United States, the natural question is whether they face the same hostility as do black 
populations.  Contrary to expectations, there is mixed evidence that the documented patterns of 
prejudice and discrimination towards blacks would be replicated for Latinos. 
 Both Lieberson (1980) and Massey and Denton (1993) have argued that patterns of 
prejudice and discrimination for blacks are not replicated for other minority group members. 
Similarly, Link and Oldindick‘s (1996) research asserts that whites are most likely to be hostile 
towards blacks and less so to Latinos. This hostility towards Latinos that Link and Oldindick 
have noted most likely stems from whites‘ assumptions of the illegality of Latino migrants and 
antagonism resulting from the English language barrier. Taylor (1998) finds that neither Asian 
nor Latino population size significantly affect whites‘ views about these minority populations. 
However, Taylor does find that Southern whites report greater anti-Latino prejudice. Dixon and 
Rosenbaum (2004) reveal that while an increase in the percentage of blacks lead to an increase in 
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anti-black stereotypes, this was not true for the Latino population. Indeed, an increase in the 
percentage of Latinos typically reduced anti-Latino stereotypes.  
 But there is evidence to the contrary; Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) discovered that 
public attitudes towards immigrants are closely related to unemployment rates. These authors 
find a positive relationship with the national unemployment rate and restrictionist attitudes 
towards immigrants. Quillian (1995) finds that county-level economic conditions along with the 
size of the immigrant population have an effect on attitudes towards immigrants. Also in support 
of Blalock‘s theory, Green, Strolovich, and Wong (1998) observe that anti-Latino crimes follow 
a similar pattern to Anti-black hate crimes. In their study, anti-Latino hate crimes occurred most 
often in traditionally white areas (389), but as Latino in-migration continues, the authors contend 
that anti-Latino hate crime should decline. Vallas, Zimmerman, and Davis (2009) test several 
theoretical approaches to the study of anti-immigrant sentiment and find that AIS (anti-
immigrant sentiment) scores were higher in regions where the influx of immigrants was smaller. 
The authors suggest that this finding is due to the effect of a generalized belief system towards 
all immigrants rather than personal or local experience. Perhaps so, but this seems to be a rather 
narrow, ad-hoc explanation in a mix of confusing and inconsistent findings. The next section 
explains how these inconsistencies might be reconciled by accounting for changes in Latino 
migration patterns. 
Latino Immigration in Old and New Destinations 
Early Latino migrants (prior to the 1980‘s) often came to the United States temporarily in 
order to meet short-term financial goals. Once these goals were met, the majority of migrants 
returned to their native homes possibly to return later to repeat the two way trip (Durand and 
Massey 2006). However, immigration reform in the 1980‘s halted these circular visits due to the 
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increased militarization of the United State‘s border (Cornelius 2001). The purpose behind 
increased security procedures at the border was to halt the flow of Latino migrants into the 
United States. However, the result was not as expected. Rather than keeping out the migrants, it 
prompted those already here to stay for fear that they could not return. Thus, immigration reform 
of the 1980‘s, according to Massey and Capoferro (2009), contrary to its intended effect, created 
new permanent settlements along with a massive rise in Latino population growth.   
But more importantly for this analysis, Latinos have begun settling into new destination 
areas. At one time, Latino migrants settled mainly in California, Texas and Illinois (Massey and 
Capoferro 2009).  But during the 1990s, Latinos began settling in new destinations for several 
reasons. First, physical blockades were placed at traditional entry points in the Southwest in 
order to keep Latino immigrants out of the United States. But contrary to intention, these 
blockades simply redirected migrants away from traditional settlement areas toward new 
destinations around the country (Durand, Massey, & Chavret 2000). Simply put, they crossed at 
new entry routes through Arizona and New Mexico and moved deeper into the U.S. from there 
(Massey and Capoferro 2009). Second, the large magnitude of legalizations stemming from 
immigrant reform served to overwhelm many labor markets in traditional settlement areas, 
especially California. In response to the flooding of local labor markets and the over-supply of 
labor, Latino migrants left traditional settlement areas in search of employment in other areas of 
the United States (Massey and Capoferro 2009). Third, coupled with the over-supply of labor, 
the recession of California‘s economy also served as a push factor in the movement of Latino 
migrants away from their traditional California settlements. Finally, the passage of Proposition 
187 in California led to anti-immigrant attitudes across California and sent a clear message that 
immigrants were no longer welcome in California (Calavita 1996). 
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Their arrival in new destinations had a major impact in places that heretofore had never 
seen a significant Latino presence. In rural areas alone, about 200 counties would have declined 
in population between 2000 and 2005 were it not for the immigration of Latinos (Lichter and 
Johnson 2006). The influx of so many Latino workers shifted the ethnic composition of low-skill 
labor markets. The shift displaced black workers in urban areas, resulting in a rise in black 
violence (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a). Likewise, in rural areas, the influx of Latinos displaced 
white workers, leading to a corresponding rise in white violence (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010b).  
There is suggestive evidence that Latinos‘ arrival in new destinations was not welcome. 
Based on a county-level analysis, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) find that Latinos in new 
destinations are murdered at a rate 50% higher than those in old destinations. Moreover, the 
same research finds that a lack of exposure to English makes Latinos in new destinations 
particularly vulnerable to murder. There is no such linguistic effect in traditional areas, where 
Latino immigrants apparently arrive into the loving arms of a well-established immigrant 
community in a culturally familiar setting. But in new destinations, the rapid influx of people 
who look ―different‖ and speak another language would be highly conspicuous and could 
generate significant hostility among the local, English-only, non-Latino constituency. In other 
words, even though Latinos in old and new destinations share cultural traits, in terms of their 
macro-social contexts, they are a world apart.  
Applying this to the present question, it appears that Latinos in the U.S. live in two 
distinct socio-cultural contexts. One is in traditional immigrant areas, well organized safe 
havens, where Latinos thrive without being penalized for being different, and where even non-
Latinos may have reconciled the areas‘ long-established Latino legacy. The other is in new 
destinations, where Latinos might be viewed by locals as a threat to jobs and to their way of life. 
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Without accounting for this geographic difference, in my view, one cannot properly understand 
the macro-social causes of anti-Latino prejudice and discrimination. This oversight may explain 
the contradictory findings in previous literature and the inconsistent support for Blalock‘s power-
threat hypothesis when applied to Latino communities.  
Based on this discussion, I put forth the following hypotheses:  
1) There will be a positive relationship between percent change in the population of 
Latinos and resentment toward them among non-Latinos.  
2) This effect will exist in new Latino destinations. There will be no link in old 
destinations.  
3) The arrival of Latinos will trigger a broad resentment, not just toward Latinos 
specifically, but toward blacks as well.  
4) The link between Latino population and anti-Latino prejudice will be explained in 
part by the structure of the local labor market.  
In order to pursue this line of reasoning I combine Census data from 1990 and 2000 with 












DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
 This research is a secondary data analysis of Census data for 1990 and 2000 and of 
General Social Survey (GSS - NORC) data for 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 at the county 
level. Some of the data used in this analysis are derived from Sensitive Data Files of the GSS, 
obtained under special contractual arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of 
respondents. These data are not available from the author. Persons interested in obtaining GSS 
Sensitive Data Files should contact the GSS at GSS@NORC.org.  County-level data from the 
GSS is restricted because respondents can potentially be identified. I obtained these restricted 
data only after I provided documentation of approval by the local Institutional Review Board 
(IRB), a sensitive data plan, an application for GSS geo-code information, and a signed contract 
for use of this special GSS extract.  
 This research considers the 454 counties with at least 500 Latinos that were sampled by 
the GSS in the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 (relevant data not available for odd 
years), for which 1990 and 2000 Census data were available, and for which old/traditional or 
new destination status was determined.  In order to test my hypotheses both county and 
individual variables will be used.  
 County-level indicators are obtained from the 1990 and 2000 Census Summary Tape 








 The primary dependent variable measures how respondents feel toward Latinos (or other 
groups). Specifically, the survey asks on a 9 point scale how warm (1) or cool (9) respondents 
feel towards Latinos: Feel-Latino. I also model attitudes towards minorities in general (Feel-
Minorities) as a way of tapping generalized anti-minority prejudice. Specifically, this is a factor 
reduction of attitudes towards Latinos (see above) and attitudes towards blacks.  
Substantive Independent Variable 
 The main substantive independent variable is percent change in the Latino population in a 
given county from 1990 to 2000 (Latino Population Change).  
Other Independent Variables 
 Individual-level control variables include Age, Sex, and Education (highest year of 
school completed) of the survey respondent. I also include several county-level variables. Given 
Blalock‘s hypothesis linking economic threat to discrimination against minorities, I include an 
index of county economic deprivation for each county. This index combines the proportion of 
single-headed households for the county, the proportion of residents within the county living 
below the poverty line, and the proportion of residents who are jobless (not unemployed, in order 
to capture discouraged workers). County Education is the percent of residents over 25 with a 
high school degree. I originally included this variable in the deprivation index but it did not load 
well with the factor, so it is included separately in the model.  Vacant housing is the proportion 
of all housing units that are vacant. Percent Latino Population is the percent of a county‘s 
population that is comprised of Latinos in 2000 while Percent Black Population is the percent 
of a county‘s population that is comprised of blacks in 2000. Percent Change in the Black 
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Population measures the percentage change of blacks within each county that occurred from 
1990 to 2000.  
Blalock‘s heuristic model is hinged in part on the perceived economic threat posed by 
minorities. Thus, any test of the proposition must account for the underlying occupational or 
industrial structure of the area. Given the Latino success in low-skill job sectors, I include the 
proportion of jobs in the county that are low skilled (Low Skill). Low skill is defined as 
industrial sectors where more than 50% of individuals (age 25 and older) working in that sector 
lack a high school diploma. Industrial sectors (pooled) defined as low skill are Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishing; Mining; Construction; Manufacturing; Transportation; Retail Trade; 
Accommodation and Food services; Other services; and Waste Management.  I also estimate 
additional models that account for only the extreme lower end of the job market (Extreme Low-
Skill). This includes four industrial sectors with the lowest level of educational attainment; 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; Mining; Construction; and Accommodation and Food 
services. 
 As per the substantive argument, the models are run separately for old and new 
destinations which reflects the bifurcation of Latino immigration patterns.  Old/traditional 
destination areas, previously defined by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010), include counties in 
California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Arizona, and New Mexico. New destinations are 
counties in states that had a 50% or greater increase in the Latino population from 1990 and 2000 
and include counties from North Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, South Carolina, 
Nevada, Alabama, Minnesota, Kentucky, Nebraska, Iowa, Mississippi, Oregon, Delaware, Utah, 
Indiana, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Virginia, Kansas, and Rhode Island.  
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 The analytical method for the multivariate models is Ordinary Least Squares. Analysis 
reveals that multicollinearity is not a problem. None of the variance inflation factors are greater 
than 2.0 and no inter-correlations between the independent variables exceeds .50. If they do 
exceed that level, as did the deprivation variables, then I follow standard procedure and collapse 
























The descriptive results in Table 1 reinforce the expectations that populations in new 
destination areas will feel more coolly towards Latinos than those in old destination areas despite 
the overall population of Latinos, meaning that anti-Latino antagonism does not appear to grow 
as the Latino population increases in all areas. According to the results, despite the fact that 
Latinos are far more populous in old destinations (20.3%) than in new destinations (3.8%), 
respondents in new destinations are cooler toward Latinos (3.43 versus 3.91 – a higher number is 
cooler or more negative). So at face value, it appears that Blalock is wrong.  
But this conclusion ignores the tectonic shifts in the demography of Latino communities. 
Note that between 1990 and 2000, Latino county populations grew by 71.4% in old destination 
states and by 314.9% in new areas, or more than four times as much.  This hints that anti-Latino 
sentiment may be linked not to the mere presence or size of a particular minority, but to the 
social context of these communities. In short, history is important to understand prejudice. 
Interestingly, it may not be just linked to change, but perhaps to factors specific to the Latino 
community. Indeed, the results also show that despite moderate differences between old and new 
destinations in the population increase of blacks, attitudes towards them do not differ. (3.41 
versus 3.41).   
Multivariate Analysis 
 In this phase of the analysis, models 1-3 predict anti-Latino attitudes by using the Latino 
population change measures, in the presence of relevant controls. The results are presented in 
Table 2.  
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Table1: Descriptive Statistics of Individual and County-Level Variables for non-Latinos in Old 
and New Destinations, 2000 
Mean     Standard Deviation 
Individual-Level Variables 
Feel-Latino       3.69ɤ       2.08ɤ   
      (3.43)ŧ                  (2.14)ŧ 
      (3.91)τ                  (2.14)τ 
Feel-Black          3.44         2.05  
        (3.41)      (2.15) 
        (3.41)      (2.05) 
Age                      47.51      17.23 
                   (47.98)                               (17.05) 
                   (47.05)                  (17.34) 
Education       13.58         2.89 
                   (13.92)                                 (2.85) 
                   (13.27)                    (2.89) 
Sex          1.55                        .50 
                     (1.55)                      (.50) 
                     (1.55)                      (.50) 
County-Level Variables 
Latino Population change               158.29                                 21.19 
                 (71.38)                                            (38.60) 
               (314.89)                                          (303.75) 
Vacant Housing            18693.15                           28819.84 
           (41175.34)                           (42005.9) 
             (6030.53)              (6918.22) 
County Education    29.51                      7.07  
                (25.45)                   (5.73) 
                (31.22)                   (6.96) 
County Economic Deprivation 
Poverty Rate                    .12                     .052 
                   (.13)                    (.05) 
                   (.12)                    (.05) 
Jobless Rate                    .04                      .01 
                   (.05)                    (.01) 
                   (.04)                    (.01) 
Single Parent Households               32.22                      7.8 
               (33.72)                  (7.23) 
               (31.84)                  (7.13) 
Percent Latino Population                              9.19                                11.43 
               (20.31)                                           (14.20) 
                 (3.77)                  (3.12) 
Percent Black Population               12.61                  13.74 
               (10.91)                  (8.16) 
               (16.50)                (14.88) 
 




Percent Change in Black Population               33.05                 50.77 
               (24.26)               (37.78)  
                 (39.0)               (64.29) 
Low skill Industry                    .60                     .08 
                   (.57)                                             (.06) 
                   (.62)                  (.09) 
Low Skill Extreme                   .15                    .04 
                                             (.14)                               (.04) 
                                (.16)                               (.04)  
N=2486; Old Destination N= 748; New Destination N=809 
ɤ Total, ŧ Old Destinations; τ New Destinations 
 
Table 2: Linear Regression Estimates predicting Non-Latino Feelings towards Latinos, 
2000 
Feel-Latino 
     
                  Model 1                        Model 2                   Model 3                  
  
Individual-Level Variables 
                                       
Age                                                    .011**(.096)                   .019**(.148)                       .005(.040)        
Sex                                       -.337**(-.081)                -.474**(-.110)                   -.187(-.043)       




Latino Population Change            .001**(.067)                 .004(.087)                  .001**(.104)            
Vacant Housing                                          2.864(.40)                   4.412*(.087)                    3.036(.013)            
County Education                                        .013(.045)                    -.007(-.018)                  .032**(.105)         
County Economic Deprivation     .028(-.013)                      .120(.050)                   -.030(-.013)            
Percent Latino Population                      .016**(-.082)                -.022**(-.131)                   -.031(-.043)      
Percent Black Population                            .005(.032)                    -.003(-.010)                      .008(.062)          
Percent Change in Black Population        -.001(-.028)                     .000(-.011)                -.004**(-.080)      
   
N          2477                                  748                      810      
 
     
**p .05; *p.10 







The first model in Table 2 predicts non-Latino feelings towards Latinos for all sampled 
counties. Throughout this time frame it appears that there are significant effects of percentage 
Latino population change on age (.011), sex (-.337), and highest year of school completed           
(-.086) of the respondent. This model also predicts that there is a significant effect of both the 
Latino population in 2000 (-.016) and the percentage Latino population change from 1990 to 
2000 on feelings towards Latinos (.001). In other words, when the Latino population in 2000 is 
large, or when it increased in size from 1990 to 2000, feelings towards Latinos become cooler 
among the local non-Latino residents. This means that the model 1 results are generally 
supportive of Blalock‘s hypothesis linking minority population size/growth to anti-minority 
sentiment among the majority population.  
But the next models reveal that the effect is geographically specific and more complex 
than anticipated. Model 2 predicts feelings toward Latinos only in old destinations.  Results show 
no significant link between Latino population growth and anti-Latino sentiment. Thus, even 
though the Latino population grew by 71.4% (see Table 1), this growth is unrelated to anti-
Latino sentiment among non-Latinos. Interestingly, model 2 also reveals that the absolute size 
(not change) in the Latino population is negatively related to anti-Latino sentiment. Simply put, 
the larger the Latino population is in old destination counties, the warmer non-Latinos feel 
toward Latinos, which is counter to the Blalock hypothesis. The implication of this finding is 
discussed in the conclusion.  
But in new destinations, the results conform to expectations. According to model 3, 
increases in the percentage of the Latino population from 1990 to 2000 in new areas increase 
anti-Latino sentiment. In fact, the standardized coefficient (.104) suggests that enlarging the 
Latino population in new areas by one standard deviation, raises anti-Latino sentiment by over 
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10%. Thus, change is important in understanding prejudice. Yet, interestingly, the Latino 
population size variable (Percent Latino), the analog of the variable used in the literature on anti-
black attitudes, is not significant.  In sum, the first three models suggest that two things are 
important to understand the causes of anti-Latino sentiment; a) the history and social context of 
the minority population and, b) the change in the minority population, not its static size.  
Also significant in this model for old destinations are: age (.019), sex (-.474, males are 
more negative toward Latinos), and highest year of school complete (-.059). Other significant 
variables in new destinations are: highest year of school complete (-.110), percent with a high 
school degree (.032), and black population change (.008).  
In Table 3, I add a measure that controls for the structure of the low skill labor market 
(Low Skill Industry – the proportion of jobs that are in low skill industries).  
Table 3: Linear Regression Estimates predicting Non-Latino Feelings towards Latinos, 
2000 
Feel-Latino 
       Model 4                                 Model 5                   
Individual-Level Variables 
                                       
Age                   .019**(.150)                 .005(.040)                       
Sex                                         -.470**(-.109)            -.182(-.043) 




Latino Population Change         .004(.072)          .001**(.091) 
Vacant Housing                      4.484**(.088)                     3.787(.446)              
County Education                  -.014(-.039)                           .024(1.208)                            
County Economic Deprivation          .123(.052)            -.043(-.303)             
Percent Latino Population                                    -.025**(-.150)                          -.029(-.041) 
Percent Black Population                    -.001(-.004)                             .009(.063)                     
Percent Change in Black Population         .000(-.004)          -.004**(-.079) 
Low Skill Industry        1.150(.036)                             .896(.035) 
Extreme Low-Skill           -.878(-.016)                             .333(.135) 
   
N                                                748                                            810      
 
**p .05; *p.10 
# Standardized coefficients are shown in parenthesis  
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In this Table, Model 4 predicts non-Latino feelings towards Latinos in old destinations, 
controlling for low skill jobs. This variable is not significant in the model, and its addition 
changes nothing in the substantive findings of the other variables. Likewise in model 5, for new 
destinations, there is no significant link between the relative size of the low-skill labor market 
and the feelings towards Latinos. And still, any link between Latino population change and anti-
Latino sentiment across the entire country (model 1, Table 2) is actually located in new 
destinations. Similarly, when the extreme low-skill is controlled for I find no significant link 
between the relative size of the extreme low-skill labor market and feelings towards Latinos in 
old or new destinations. Again, I find that the effect of anti-Latino sentiment is found only in 
new destinations.  
In Table 4, I go beyond predicting anti-Latino sentiment to see if a rapid population 
increase in the Latino population translates into generalized anti-minority sentiment. In this 
phase of the analysis, the dependent variable predicted in the models is an index that combines 
feelings toward Latinos and towards blacks (among non-Latinos).  
Model 6 predicts this variable for old destinations only. As with prior results, the effect of 
Latino population change is not significant in counties located in these old areas. The only 
significant county-level variables are vacant housing (1.862) and the relative size of the Latino 
population  (-0.10).  
 In new areas, however, Latino population change is a significant predictor of anti-Latino 
sentiment (.001). This implies that when the Latino population grows in size in new destinations, 
the local non-Latino residents tend to feel more negative towards minorities in general – defined 
as both Latinos and blacks. The standardized coefficient in the model is larger than in all other 
models for new destinations. The resulting coefficient of .121 suggests that when the 10-year 
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increase in the Latino population is accelerated by one standard deviation, the generalized anti-
minority sentiment among non-Latinos in new destinations rises by 12.1%. These findings are 
discussed in more detail below.  
Table 4: Linear Regression Estimates predicting Non-Latino Feelings towards Minorities, 
2000 
Feel-Minorities 
       Model 6                                 Model 7                   
Individual-Level Variables 
                                       
Age                  .010**(.160)   .004**(.075)   
Sex                               -.304**(-.143)               -.192**(-.096)                 




Latino Population Change      .002(.079)   .001**(.121)  
Vacant Housing                           1.862*(.074)           1.867(.018)   
County Education                                        -.002(-.009)                 .012*(.086) 
County Economic Deprivation                   .068(.058)                                     .033(.030)                      
Percent Latino Population              -.010**(-.122)                                  -.018(-.055)                 
Percent Black Population                                       -.003(-.026)                 -.003(-.045)  
Percent Change in Black Population                   8.852(.004)                           -.001*(-.065) 
   
N                                                748                                            809      
 














DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Prior evidence has generally supported the Blalock proposition that large minority 
populations tend to make the majority feel threatened. As a result, the majority population then 
begins to acquire negative feelings – prejudice – toward the minority. But while studies have 
confirmed this as one cause of anti-black prejudice, the research on anti-Latino prejudice has, in 
contrast, yielded a mix of confusing findings. This confusion, my thesis suggests, is because 
previous studies on Latino population have missed a critical element in the demography of 
Latino immigration. Latinos in the United States are essentially split into two groups: those that 
settled in old destinations where there is a strong immigrant community and those that more 
recently settled in new destinations around the country. These two Latino populations live in 
very different social contexts and, as a result, elicit very different reactions among the local non-
Latino population.  As such, my research produces the following four interrelated findings: 1) 
There is a positive relationship between percent change in the population of Latinos and 
resentment toward them among non-Latinos. 2) This effect exists in new Latino destinations, but 
not in old destinations. 3) The arrival of Latinos generates a broader resentment, not just toward 
Latinos specifically, but toward other minorities as well. 4) There is no significant link between 
the relative size of the low-skill labor market and anti-Latino prejudice. These findings confirm 
the first three hypotheses. But the fourth finding does not support the final hypothesis. 
Specifically, my results do not confirm that anti-minority sentiment (in this case, toward Latinos) 
is rooted in a competition over jobs. There are several implications of these findings. 
First, social context is important to consider when searching for the causes of prejudice. 
Prior research on anti-Latino prejudice may have construed Latino communities too broadly. In 
27 
 
traditional Latino areas, large Latino populations generally elicit a positive reaction among the 
rest of the population who over the years may have reconciled/welcomed the ethnic makeup of 
their community. But in new Latino settlement areas, the rapid influx of Latinos was a shock to 
some local residents who watched the ethnic composition of their communities change swiftly.  
The reaction to their new neighbors was decidedly negative. This suggests two things: 1) the 
history and structural context of the minority group must be considered in future tests of 
Blalock‘s hypothesis and, indeed, any research on the causes of prejudice and, 2) the context of 
the majority also must be considered when accounting for their reaction to minority members. 
For Latinos in the U.S., specifically, they may have the same roots, but they live in two distinct 
social worlds.  
Second, prejudice is linked to the change in the minority population, not its relative size. 
Unfortunately, much of the prior research in this area models the mere size of the minority 
population. Perhaps that may be relevant to black prejudice, but the causes of anti-Latino 
sentiment are more complex. Forty years ago (about 1970) 1 in 18 residents in the U.S. was 
Latino, whereas by 2025, that number will be 1 in 4. That is a dramatic change by any account, 
one that seems to generate anti-Latino prejudice in the areas most profoundly affected.   
  Third, this regional difference may explain why new Latinos migrants have a greater 
exposure to violence. Shihadeh and Barranco (2010d) find that the victimization rate of Latinos 
in new destination areas is 50% greater than the corresponding rate in old and well-established 
Latino areas. Indeed, the Latino rate of homicide victimization in new areas is twice that of non-
Latino whites and approaches that of blacks. In particular, the new migrants who were most at 
risk for homicide were those who knew little English. So perhaps there is a cultural basis for 
anti-Latino prejudice. For many years, Latinos settled in established immigrant communities 
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where Spanish is spoken widely, and where English is not necessary to conduct life‘s business. 
In contrast, new destinations are hardly Spanish-only environments. On the contrary, the local 
residents may view learning English as an immigrant‘s obligation to becoming an American.    
  Fourth, the cause of anti-Latino prejudice is not rooted in economics. There is a lively 
public discourse on the impact of Latino successes in agriculture, manufacturing, construction 
and so on. My findings show there is no link, however, between the low-skill job market and 
anti-Latino prejudice, casting doubt on the proposition that the majority views the minority as an 
economic threat. However, before economic determinants are cast aside, there is an important 
caveat; these county level data (and much of the opinion data) were gathered during a time of 
relative prosperity. During the 1990s and into the 2000s, there was a surge in demand in 
construction and other low-skill industries. Low-skill jobs were plentiful and the minimum wage 
was rendered virtually meaningless. But a tough recession in 2008 has elevated unemployment to 
nearly 10%. State budgets are red with ink as we enter a possibly prolonged period of austerity. 
During such times, anti-immigrant (read: anti-Latino) sentiment may spike, prompting non-
Latinos to embrace anti-immigration policies such as those recently enacted in Arizona. Thus, a 
true test of the economic causes of prejudice may be possible only when the majority faces 
objective hardship.  
 Future research should expand on these findings. Specifically, there may be race- or 
ethnic-specific causes of prejudice. Extant research defines the ―majority‖ as white and, for the 
most part, non-Latino. But there are reported tensions between blacks and Latinos over jobs. 
Recent evidence shows that Latinos are displacing blacks from low-skill jobs in urban areas 
(Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a) and displacing whites in rural areas (Shihadeh and Barranco 
2010b). And in each of these areas, the displaced population has higher rates of homicide 
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offending. So there may be some purchase in disaggregating the analysis by race and ethnicity, 
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